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INTRODUCTION

In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United
States sent military forces into the desolate and unforgiving landscape of
Afghanistan in order to capture or kill Osama bin Laden and the members
and supporters of his terrorist organization, al-Qaeda. While pacifying the
mountain nation, the U.S. military captured hundreds of men suspected of
carrying out or planning terrorist attacks against the United States' interests.
Many of these men were brought to the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba, where they were detained and interrogated.
After the capture and detention of these suspected terrorists, a veritable
political firestorm erupted. Many politicians and legal scholars called on
the federal courts to intervene and consider the legality of the Guantanamo
Bay detentions even though Guantanamo Bay arguably lies outside the
sovereign territory of the United States.1 In response, the Bush Administration argued that the detainees were "enemy aliens ' 2 and thus precluded
from seeking relief in the federal courts. The administration did, however,
guarantee that the detainees would be afforded "fair and equitable" hearings
before designated military tribunals.3 Defending this decision, Vice
President Dick Cheney stated that the detainees do not "deserve the same
guarantees and safeguards that would be used for an American citizen
going through the normal judicial process." 4
These opposing views spurred the litigation at issue in Rasul v. Bush 5
where the Supreme Court was called upon to decide the "narrow" issue of
"whether United States courts lack jurisdiction to consider challenges to the
1. See Dianne Marie Amann, Guantanamo,42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 263, 266
(2004) [hereinafter Amann]; Carol Rosenberg, Detentions at Guantanamo Bay "grave
mistake," Lawmakers say, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 7, 2004, at 14 [hereinafter Rosenberg]; Mark
Bixler, CarterChides U.S. on Rights, ATLANTA J. CONST., Nov. 12, 2003, at Al [hereinafter
Bixler] (reporting former President Jimmy Carter's characterization of detention policy as "a
bad precedent").
2.
The government defines an "enemy alien" as an individual who "is part of or
supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners, and engaged in an armed
conflict against the United States." Dep't of Defense, Fact Sheet Guantanamo Detainees,
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/detainees.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2005)
[hereinafter Fact Sheet]. The label has also been used throughout American history to
describe enemies of the nation. See David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History
in the War on Terrorism, 38 HARv. C.R.-C. L. L. REv. 1, 15-16 (2003).

President Issues Military Order - Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain
3.
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg 57,833, 57,833-354 (Nov. 16,
2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011113-27.html

[hereinafter Presidential Order].
Peter Slevin & George Lardner, Jr., Bush Planfor Terrorism Trials Defended,
4.
WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2001, at A28 (quote attributed to Vice President Dick Cheney).
5.
542 U.S. 466 (2004).
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legality of the detention of foreign nationals captured abroad in connection
with hostilities [connected with the war
on terror] and incarcerated at the
6
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba.",
In deciding the issue, the Court had to consider the territorial limits of
federal court jurisdiction under the habeas corpus statute,7 which authorizes
federal district courts "within their respective jurisdictions" to entertain
habeas applications by persons claiming to be held "in custody in violation
of the . . . laws . . . of the United States." 8 Accordingly, the Court was
forced to examine the continued viability of Johnson v. Eisentrager,9 a
World War II era case, which previously construed the habeas statute as
precluding enemy aliens held outside the territory of the United States from
petitioning the federal courts for habeas corpus relief.' 0
Aside from the strict language of the habeas statute as construed by
Eisentrager,the Court would have to decide whether to follow the timehonored principle of judicial restraint when considering the scope of federal
court jurisdiction. The Court had previously found that the "[flederal courts
are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized
by Constitution and by statute"" and that power is carefully guarded
against expansion by judicial interpretation or decree.' 2 Moreover, during
times of war the Court has expressed an even greater reluctance to test the
boundaries of its jurisdiction for fears of encroaching on the province of the
Executive Branch, thus hindering the Executive's ability to effectively
prosecute war. 13
Flouting the Eisentrager statutory holding and the long-established
policies of judicial restraint, the Court in Rasul, nevertheless, expanded the
territorial jurisdiction of the federal courts by extending the right of habeas
corpus to the Guantanamo detainees, thereby recasting the textual understanding of the habeas statute. This article discusses the controversies and
implications of this remarkable holding.
Part I explains the political and historical context surrounding Rasul.
Part II explores the history and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus, and
examines the historical territorial reach of the writ. Part III examines
Supreme Court precedent considering the question of the territorial reach of
6.
Rasul v. Bush, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert granted, 124 S.Ct. 534
(U.S. Nov. 10, 2003) (Nos. 03-334, 03-343).
7.

28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000).

8.
28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), (c)(3) (emphasis added).
9.
339 U.S. 763 (1950).
10.
Id. at 777-81 (The Eisentrager court interpreted the "within their respective
jurisdictions" language of the statute as requiring the physical presence of the detainee
within the territorial jurisdiction of a federal district court).
11.
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).
12.
Id.; see also Am. Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17-18 (1951).
13.
See e.g., Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 788-89.
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the habeas statute. Part IV discusses the controversial holding of Rasul, and
critically analyzes the majority and dissenting opinions. 14 Part V reveals
the broad implications of the "narrow" Rasul holding, explaining how the
decision dramatically expands the territorial scope of the habeas statute.
Finally, Part VI considers the implicit normative reasoning that may help
explain the Court's decision in a broader context, and suggests possible
legislative reforms to ameliorate the negative consequences of Rasul.
I.
A.

HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT

THE SEPTEMBER 11TH ATTACKS AND THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN

September 11, 2001, was one of the darkest days in American history.
Agents of the al-Qaeda terrorist network unleashed a devastating assault
upon the commercial, financial, and military power centers of the United
States by hijacking four commercial airliners carrying thousands of pounds
of jet fuel, and crashing them into15 the World Trade Center, the Pentagon,
and the Pennsylvania countryside.
After the smoke settled, approximately 3,000 people had lost their
lives-twice the number killed at Pearl Harbor. The World Trade Center
lay in ruins, broken by the impact of the explosions and the intense heat
created by the blasts. What was once a proud symbol of the United States'
economic strength was reduced to a smoking heap of over 200,000 pounds
of twisted, charred steel. The Pentagon, headquarters of every branch 6of
the United States military, suffered major damage to its outer perimeter.'
President George W. Bush immediately characterized the attacks as
"an act of war" and vowed a quick response.' 7 Shortly thereafter, Congress
passed a joint resolution authorizing the President "to use all necessary and
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks...
or harbored such organizations or persons." 18 Armed with this authority, on
October 7, 2001, the President sent United States Armed Forces into
Afghanistan to destroy al-Qaeda, and topple the Taliban regime that
14.
Justice Kennedy filed a brief concurrence joining the majority in its ultimate
conclusion. However, Kennedy agreed with Justice Scalia's statutory jurisdictional analysis.
542 U.S. at 485 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
32.

15.

See Nancy Gibbs, If You Want to Humble an Empire, TIME, Sept. 14, 2001, at

16.
Id.
BBC News, Bush Calls Attacks 'Acts of War' (Sept. 12, 2001), at
17.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/americas/ 1537534.stm.
18.
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001) (codified as 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2005)).
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supported it. 19 By December 21, 2001, the United States had taken control

of Afghanistan, and taken prisoner approximately 7,000 suspected al-Qaeda
and Taliban members.2 ° Many of these prisoners remained in U.S. custody
in Afghanistan; however, over 600 were transported to Camp Delta, a
newly constructed detention facility, located at the United States naval
station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.2 '
The President declared that the extraordinary emergency the nation
faced necessitated the extraordinary treatment of those involved in "acts of
international terrorism," and issued a military order providing that all nonU.S. citizens captured during the Afghanistan conflict, whom were
suspected as agents or culpable supporters of al-Qaeda, were subject to trial
by military tribunals.22 The Presidential order stipulated that those deemed
enemy aliens by the Executive Branch and held at Guantanamo Bay were to
receive humane treatment, and "when tried, to be tried for violations of the
laws of war and other applicable laws by military tribunals. 23 These
19.
Ian Christopher McCaleb, Bush Announces Opening of Attacks, (Oct. 7, 2001),
at http://archives.cnn.com/2001/ US/10/07/ret.attack.bush/index.html.
20.
Guardian Unlimited, U.S. Questions 7,000 Taliban and al-Qaeda Soldiers,
(Dec. 21, 2001), at http://www.guardian.co.uk/afghanistan/story/0,1284, 623701, 00.html.
21.
Neil A. Lewis, Red Cross Criticizes Indefinite Detention in Guantanamo Bay,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 2003, at Al [hereinafter Lewis]. Most of the detainees held at
Guantanamo Bay were captured in Afghanistan, however, at least 200 were reportedly
seized in Europe or Africa. See Richard J. Wilson, United States Detainees at Guantanamo
Bay: The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Responds to a "Legal Black Hole,"
10 Hum. Rts. Br. 2 (2003). In 1903, following the Spanish-American War, the United States
leased the Guantanamo Bay land from Cuba, and in 1934 the two nations agreed that the
United States would have indefinite possession of Guantanamo Bay. See Lease of Lands
for Coaling and Naval Stations, Feb. 16-23, 1903, U.S.-Cuba, 6 Bevans 1113 [hereinafter
1903 Treaty]; Treaty Defining Relations between the United States of America and Cuba,
May 29, 1934, U.S.-Cuba, art. 3, 48 Stat. 1682, 1683 [hereinafter 1934 Treaty].
Presidential Order, supra note 3, at 57,833. The President's Order states, inter
22.
alia, that individuals subject to the order include: (1) current or past members of al-Qaeda;
(2) individuals who "engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of
international terrorism, or acts in preparation therefore" that adversely affected the United
States' interests; and (3) individuals who "knowingly harbored one or more individuals"
described above. Id. at 57,834 (§. 2(a)). For a thorough discussion of the history and
procedures of military commissions see Michael 0. Lacey, Military Commission: A
Historical Survey, 2002-Mar. ARMY LAW 41, 41; Juan R. Torruella, On the Slippery Slopes
of Afghanistan: Military Commissions and the Exercise of PresidentialPower, 4 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 648, 687 (2002). This presidential order caused a tremendous stir amongst legal
scholars who believed the order subverted the U.S. Constitution. See e.g., Neal K. Katyal &
Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE
L.J. 1259, 1270 (2002) (arguing that the order violates separation of powers principles
because the President is moving "outside the perimeter of his role as Commander in Chief..
. and entered a zone that involves judging and punishing alleged violations of the law,
including the laws of nations (which encompasses the laws of war).").
23.
Presidential Order, supra note 3. When individuals are first captured in
Afghanistan, they undergo a multi-step screening process to determine whether they are
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tribunals were to be sui generis, operating outside the ordinary military or
civilian criminal justice system. They were required to afford defendants
"fair and equitable" hearings; however, adherence to "the principles of law
and the rules of evidence24 generally recognized" by federal courts were
deemed "not practicable.,
B.

THE "POLITICAL FIRESTORM"

The U.S. detention program at Guantanamo Bay soon opened a global
chorus of disapproval. Many international organizations criticized the
presidential directives citing contention over the "open endedness" of the
detentions and the administration's use of Guantanamo Bay as an "investigation center" rather than a holding center.
At home, legal scholars
almost uniformly criticized the President's policy as ignoring basic
international norms.2 6 The level of criticism rose steadily, and by early
2004 a British Law Lord, 27 Spain's Foreign Minister, 28 a Nobel Peace Prize
winner, 29 a former U.S. President, 30 and several members of Congress 31 had
accused the Bush administration of numerous violations of international
law. 32
Many of the administration's critics grudgingly recognized, however,
that under present domestic law the President's actions appeared beyond
judicial review, because the detainees were held outside the sovereign

enemy aliens. After an individual is determined to be an "enemy alien" the individual is sent
to a centralized holding area where a military screening team reviews the circumstances of
the capture, the threat the individual poses, his intelligence value, and thus determines
whether continued detention is warranted. Persons considered to have high-intelligence
value or pose serious threats may be transferred to Guantanamo Bay. See Fact Sheet, supra
note 2.
24.
Presidential Order, supra note 3.
25.
Lewis, supra note 21.
26.
See, e.g., Amann, supra note 1.
27.
Johan Steyn, GuantanamoBay: The Legal Black Hole, at
http://www.nimj.com/documents/Guantanamo.PDF (Nov. 25, 2003) [hereinafter Steyn]
(Twenty-Seventh FA Mann Lecture, delivered by Law Lord to British Institute of
International and Comparative Law).
28.
Bixler, supra note I (reporting that Spanish Foreign Minsiter Ana Palacio called
the President's actions a "major error").
29.
Shirin Ebadi, Nobel Lecture (Dec. 10, 2003), availableat
http://www.nobelprize.org/peace/laureates/2003/ebadi-lecture-e.html.
30.
See Bixler, supra note I (reporting former President Jimmy Carter's
characterization of the detention policy as "a bad precedent").
31.
Rosenberg, supra note 1.
32.
See Amann, supra note 1; Steyn, supra note 27.
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territory of the United States.33 Not to be deterred, these scholars argued
that the legal precedents 34 upon which the Executive relied were "anachronistic" and an anathema to international norms.35 Many called on the
Supreme Court to ignore these decisions (and other long-standing legal
policies), and apply what one scholar called "[e]xternal norms" to extend
habeas jurisdiction and grant the Guantanamo Bay detainees relief under
the statute.36
1I.

ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

To better appreciate Rasul and the body of case law considering the
territorial reach of the habeas statute, it is useful to engage in a brief
discussion of the origins and purpose of the "great writ." The writ of
habeas corpus is the traditional means used by federal (and state) courts to
determine whether prisoners have been deprived of their freedom in
violation of law. 37 Its name (translated "that you have the body") denotes
its function. It is a tool for challenging the most severe and egregious
violations of personal liberty-an unjustified detention by the state.38
Although most writs considered in the federal courts today are brought by
those seeking relief from state criminal detentions, the writ has long served
to restrain unlawful detentions by the executive branch.39 Speaking on the
importance of the writ, Justice Story said:
It is ... justly esteemed the great bulwark of personal lib-

erty; since it is the appropriate remedy to ascertain, whether
any person is rightfully in confinement or not, and the
cause of his confinement; and if no sufficient ground of detention appears, the party is entitled to his immediate discharge. This writ is most beneficially construed; and is applied to every case of illegal restraint, whatever it may; for

33.
See e.g., Steven R. Swanson, Enemy Combatants and the Writ of Habeas
Corpus, 35 ARiz. ST. L. J. 939, 1005-06 (2003) (concluding that although the U.S. position
may be contrary to international standards, domestic law justifies the detentions).
34.
These precedents included Johnson v. Eisentrager,339 U.S. 763 (1950).
35.
See, e.g. Amann, supra note 1.
36.
See id. at 300-01 (arguing that the courts should pay special attention to norms
and practices outside the United States in order to gauge the evolution "of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society.") (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 & n.28
(1958)).
37.
See DAVID CLARK & GERARD McCoy, THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL RIGHT:
HABEAS CORPUS IN THE COMMONWEALTH 30 (2000).

38.
See id. (describing the writ's function in cases in which people have simply
disappeared while in state custody).
39.
See Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure Jurisprudence §
4261 (2d ed. 1988).
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every restraint on a man's liberty is, in the eye of the law,
an imprisonment, wherever may be the place, or whatever
may be the manner, in which the restraint is effected.4 °
The writ traces its roots to thirteenth century England, where it was
'
used by courts "to secure the appearance of an unwilling defendant."'
During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, English common law courts
used the writ as a means of obtaining authority over prisoners detained by
manorial courts. 42 In 1627, during the reign of Charles I, the writ evolved
into a mechanism used to challenge unlawful confinement by the state.43
During that year, in a case known as the Case of the Five Knights,44 the
King's Bench entertained arguments stating that the court should employ
the writ to enforce the Magna Carta's guarantee that the Crown could take
no action against a free man "except by lawful judgment of his peers or by
the law of the land.' 4 5 The King offered no explanation for the arrests
which gave rise to the case, but the court, unwilling to challenge the
authority of the Crown, nevertheless presumed that the prisoner's detention
was lawful. This decision prompted a response from Parliament, and in
1641 that body enacted The Petition of Right limiting the Crown's ability to
arrest without probable cause and allowing a detained person an immediate
right to a judicial hearing. 46
Following its legislative adoption in England, the "writ became a viable bulwark between the powers of government and the rights of the
people. ' 7 The Crown was now subject to the law and could no longer
arbitrarily imprison subjects. 48 The writ's impact was not only felt in the
domestic context, but the King's courts also began to consider the territorial
reach of the writ.4 9 In its cases, the English courts formulated several
bright-line rules as to the territorial reach of habeas corpus. First, the writ
would always be available to subjects of the Crown regardless of the locus
40.
3 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution 1333-36 (1883).
41.
WILiAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 25 (1980)
[hereinafter Duker].
42.
Id. at 27.
43.
Charles H. Whitebread & Christopher Slobogin, Criminal Procedure, An
Analysis of Cases and Concepts § 33.01 (4th ed. 2000).
44. Darnel's Case, 3 How. St. Tr. 1 (K.B. 1627).
45. See J. C. Holt, Magna Carta 328 (2d ed. 1992) (quoting from the original 1215
version).
46.
See Duker, supra note 41, at 45.
47.
See id., at 63.
48.
LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS: HABEAS CORPUS 14 (2003).
49.
Once the powers of the Crown were limited by the Habeas Act, the King's
courts were placed in the position of defining the content of the Act and their own
jurisdictional reach. See id.
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of their captivity.5 ° Secondly, the writ would apply to non-subjects only if
in territories over which the Crown enjoyed ultimate
they were confined
51
sovereignty.
Continuing the tradition of the common law, courts in the American
colonies continued to employ the writ. The Constitution explicitly
established that "[tihe [p]rivilege of the [w]rit of [h]abeas [c]orpus shall not
be suspended, unless when in [c]ases of [riebellion or [i]nvasion the public
[s]afety may require it.",52 Federal jurisdiction to grant the writ was
expressly conferred by the Judiciary Act of 1789. 53 The grant of jurisdiction was limited however, only applying to prisoners held in federal
custody. 54 In 1867, Congress enacted the Habeas Corpus Act, which
granted federal courts jurisdiction "in addition to the authority already
conferred by law" and "within their respective jurisdictions .

.

. to grant

writs of habeas corpus in all cases where any person may be restrained of
his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of
the United States. 55 Today's provision is virtually identical.56
ITI.

SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT

Before Rasul, the issue of whether federal courts possessed territorial
jurisdiction to confer the writ to an enemy alien held outside the United
States had not been considered by the Supreme Court for over a halfThe writ runs throughout "all parts of the king's dominions" because "the king
50.
is at all times entitled to have an account why the liberty of any of his subjects is restrained."
3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *13 1. See also Ex parte Mwenya, 1 Q.B. 241,
300-02 (1960) (The court was faced with the issue of whether "the Court of Queen's Bench
can be debarred from making an order in favour of a British citizen unlawfully or arbitrarily
detained" in Northern Rhodesia. In extending the writ, the court made it clear that the
disposition of the case was contingent on the detainee's status as a subject of the crown.).
51.
The writ would lie in areas such as the "exempt" territories, the Cinque Ports
and the Counties Palatine, even though the Crown had yielded control to local authorities,
however, the Crown enjoyed ultimate sovereignty of the lands. 3 W.J.AM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *78-79. The writ also extended to lands outside of England such as the
American colonies, Scotland, Ireland, and Wales, that were "not part of the kingdom of
England" but were nevertheless "dominions" of the Crown. 1 WMLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *102-105. All of the lands Blackstone listed as "dominions" were
considered the sovereign territory of the crown. Id. at *93-106.
U. S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
52.
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 81-82 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §
53.
2241 (2000)).
54.
Exparte Dorr, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 103, 105 (1845).
Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385.
55.
28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2004). Today's statute provides that the statute applies to
56.
prisoners who are "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States." Id. at § 224 1(c)(3).
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century.5 7 The primary source of law in this area was concentrated in two
earlier decisions: Ahrens v. Clark58 and Johnson v. Eisentrager.59 Also
relevant is the more modern forum selection case Braden v. 30th Judicial
Circuit Court of Kentucky, which concerned a domestically held prisoner,
but nevertheless modified the Supreme Court's understanding of the
territorial reach of the habeas statute. 6° It is to these decisions that we now
turn.
A.

AHRENS V. CLARK

In Ahrens, a World War H era case, the Supreme Court considered for
the first time the territorial limitations imposed on the federal courts by the
habeas corpus statute. The petitioners in Ahrens were 120 German citizens
held at Ellis Island, New York, by order of the United States Attorney
General. 6' The Attorney General had ordered that the prisoners be detained
and deported after finding that they were "dangerous to the public peace
and safety of the United States because [they had] adhered to a government
with which the United States is at war.",62 While incarcerated at Ellis
Island, the detainees filed a petition for habeas relief with the Federal
District Court for the District of Columbia on grounds that they were
"subject to the custody and control" of the Attorney General, and that the
district court could grant the writ even though the prisoners were located in
a different district so long as the district court exercised territorial jurisdiction over the Attorney General.6 3
The specific issue the Ahrens Court faced was "whether the presence
within the territorial jurisdiction of the district court of the person detained
is prerequisite to filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus." 64 The Court
found that "apart from specific exceptions created by Congress the
jurisdiction of the district courts is territorial. 65 After considering the
language and history of the habeas statute, 66 the Supreme Court found "that
57.
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950) (The Eisentrager decision was the
last decision dealing with this issue).
58.
335 U.S. 188 (1948).
59.
339 U.S. 763 (1950).
60.
410 U.S. 484 (1973).
61.
Ahrens, 335 U.S. at 189.
62. Id.
63.
Id. at 189.
64.
Id. (The Court noted that this question was explicitly reserved in its decision in
Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 305 (1994)).
65.
Id. at 190.
66.
Ahrens, 335 U.S. at 191 (The Court noted that its historical analysis demonstrated that "a prisoner must be held within the territorial jurisdiction of the District Court in
order to obtain from it a writ of habeas corpus."). Id.
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the jurisdiction of the district court to issue the writ in cases such as this is
restricted to those petitioners who are confined or detained within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court." 67 Thus, the Supreme Court rejected
petitioners' arguments finding that "[i]t is not sufficient ... that the jailer or
custodian [the Attorney General] alone be found in the jurisdiction" 68 of the
federal district court, ergo the Ellis Island detainees' petition was dismissed
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 69 The Court, however, explicitly
reserved "the question of what process, if any, a person confined in an area
not subject to the jurisdiction of any district court may employ to assert
federal rights., 70 That question was answered as to enemy aliens just two
years later in Eisentrager.
B.

JOHNSON V. EISENTRAGER

At issue in Eisentragerwere the claims of twenty-one German nationals who were captured by the United States military in China during World
War l1.71 The men were in the service of the German military, and were
accused of assisting the Japanese against U.S. forces.72 After their capture,
they were tried and convicted in China by an American military tribunal,
and then transported back to Germany in order to serve their sentences at
Landsberg Prison.7 3
After being transported to Germany, the prisoners petitioned the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking relief
under the habeas statute.74 The district court dismissed the petition on
authority of Ahrens.75 The Court of Appeals reversed on grounds that the
statutory construction employed by the Ahrens Court rendered the habeas
statute unconstitutional.76
In its decision the court of appeals found that "enemy aliens" captured
and held by U.S. military forces were entitled to the writ as a substantive
right under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.7 7 After making this
determination, the Court found that the text of the habeas statute as
67. Id. at 192.
68.
Id. at 190.
69. Id. at 193.
70.
Id. at 192 n. 4.
71.
Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 765-66.
72. Id. at 766.
73.
Id. at 765-66.
74. Id.
75.
Id. at 767.
76.
Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961 (D.C. Cir. 1949) rev'd sub nom. Johnson
v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
77.
Id. at 963-65 (finding that the Fifth Amendment guarantee of due process
applies to "any person" including the German detainees).
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construed in Ahrens rendered the statute powerless to protect the substantive rights of the petitioners. 78 To cure this constitutional infirmity the court
employed the canon of constitutional avoidance saying "if the existing
jurisdictional act [the habeas statute] be construed to deny the writ to a
person entitled to it as a substantive right, the act would be unconstitutional.
It should be construed, if possible, to avoid that result., 79 Employing the
canon of construction, the Court disregarded Ahrens and found that "when a
person is deprived of his liberty by the act of an official of the United
States, that person's petition for a writ of habeas corpus will lie in the
District Court which has territorial Jurisdiction over the officials who have
directive power over the immediate jailer., 80 The Court stated "[t]he statute
must be so construed, lest it be invalid as constituting a suspension of the
writ in violation of the constitutional provision.'
The Supreme Court reversed rejecting the appellate court's constitutional and statutory analysis. 82 First, the Supreme Court explained that
"enemy combatants" do not enjoy a substantive right to the writ of habeas
corpus under the rubric of Fifth Amendment due process. 83 The Court held
that the "any person" language of the amendment had to be read in "light of
the full text of that Amendment," which reads that "cases arising in the land
or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or
public danger" are exempt from its application. 84 The Court explained that
to find the Fifth Amendment granted "enemy combatants" a trial in the
federal courts would extend to enemies "a right not to be tried at all for an
offense against our armed forces" 85 due to the fact that the Sixth
Amendment requires that "in all criminal prosecutions that 'the accused' be
tried 'by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed ....,,,86Therefore, no court, military or civilian,
could consider charges brought against an enemy who has committed
crimes against American forces abroad.8 7 In effect, the Fifth Amendment
would thereby grant enemy aliens immunity from prosecution in both
military and civilian courts. The Court rejected this assertion saying:
If this Amendment [the Fifth Amendment] invests enemy
aliens in unlawful hostile action against us with immunity
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

See id. at 965.
Id. at 966.
Id. at 967.
Id.
Eisentrager,339 U.S. 763.
Id. at 781-85.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend V).
See Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 783.

2006]

OPENING THE FLOOD GATES

from military [and civilian] trial, it puts them in a more
protected position than our own soldiers. American citizens conscripted into the military service are thereby
stripped of their Fifth Amendment rights and as members
of the military are subject to its discipline... Can there be
any doubt that our foes would also have been expected, but
for the assumption 'any person' would never be read to include those in arms against us? It would be a paradox indeed if what the Amendment denied to Americans it guaranteed to enemies. 88
In addition to the constitutional holding that the detainees had no substantive right to the writ, the Court also answered the statutory question left
open by the Ahrens court. 89 The Eisentragermajority found that "these
prisoners at no relevant time were within any territory over which the
United States is sovereign, and the scenes of their offense, their capture,
their trial and their punishment were all beyond the territorial jurisdiction of
any court of the United States." 90 Therefore, in order for an enemy
combatant to invoke the right to habeas corpus under the statute he must be
found within the territorial jurisdiction of some federal district court. 91 In
support of this proposition the court noted "[wie are cited no instance where
a court, in this or any other country where the writ [of habeas corpus] is
known, has issued it on behalf of an alien enemy who, at no relevant time
92
and in no stage of his captivity, has been within its territorial jurisdiction.

88.
Id.
89. Ahrens, 335 U.S. at 192 n.4 (asking "what process, if any, a person confined in
an area not subject to the jurisdiction of any district court may employ to assert federal
rights.").
Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 778 (emphasis added).
90.
91.
See Ahrens, 335 U.S. at 192 n.4; Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 777-78.
92.
Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 768. The German prisoners did cite two cases where
the federal judiciary did issue the writ of habeas corpus to aliens. The first was Ex parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), another World War II case involving seven German citizens who
entered the United States with the express intent to commit sabotage. The second case was
In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946), a case involving a Japanese General who was captured
and held in the Philippines. The petitioners asserted that the facts of their case were
analogous to that of the parties involved in Quirin and Yamashita, and because of this, they
should be extended the same rights in federal court. The court quickly brushed aside the
petitioner's reliance on both cases. The court distinguished both Quirin and Yamashita by
noting that the petitioners were held prisoner in sovereign territory of the United States. The
Quirin petitioners were held in the District of Columbia and the Yamashita detainee was
held in the Philippines, which was under the sovereign control of the United States at the
time. Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 779-81.
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In addition to its holding, a very circumspect court issued a stem warning against the dangers of judicial extension of habeas corpus rights during
times of war:
To grant the writ to these prisoners might mean that our
army must transport them across the seas for hearing. This
would require allocation of shipping space, guarding personnel, billeting and rations. It might also require transportation for whatever witnesses the prisoners desired to call
as well as transportation for those necessary to defend legality of the sentence. The writ, since it is held to be a matter of right, would be equally available to enemies during
active hostilities as in the present twilight between war and
peace. Such trials would hamper the war effort and bring
aid and comfort to the enemy. They would diminish the
prestige of our commanders, not only with enemies but
with wavering neutrals. It would be difficult to devise more
effective fettering of a field commander than to allow the
very enemies he is ordered to reduce to submission to call
him to account in his own civil courts and divert his efforts
and attention from the military offensive abroad to the legal
defensive at home. Nor is it unlikely that the result of such
enemy litigiousness would be conflict between judicial and
military opinion highly comforting to enemies of the
United States.93
In sum, the court dismissed the petitioner's claim for habeas relief
because "[n]othing in the text of the Constitution extends such a right, nor
does anything in our statutes. 94 Therefore, Eisentrager stands for the
proposition that in order to invoke protection under the habeas statute a
detainee must be physically present within the territorial jurisdiction of
some federal district court. Since no federal district court exercised
jurisdiction over the Landsberg prison in Germany, the Eisentrager
petitioners were not entitled to the writ. Furthermore, the federal courts
should proceed cautiously in delving out habeas rights to "enemy aliens"
lest the courts impede the ability of the Executive Branch to subdue the
nation's enemies. 95

93.
Id. at 778-79.
94.
Id. at 768.
95.
For a more thorough discussion of the scope of executive power to prosecute
war, see John C. Yoo, Judicial Review and the War on Terrorism, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
427 (2003).
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BRADEN V. 30TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT OF KENTUCKY

Several decades after the Ahrens and Eisentragerdecisions, the court
once again considered the issue of the territorial jurisdiction of the federal
courts under the habeas statute. 96 This time, however, the detainee was held
within the borders of the United States.
The petitioner in Braden was incarcerated in Alabama.9 7 He filed an
application for writ of habeas corpus in a federal court in Kentucky,
challenging an indictment that had been filed against him in a Kentucky
state court and naming as respondent the Kentucky state court in which the
proceedings were pending.9 8
In distinguishing Ahrens, the Court noted several critical developments
that affected the application of Ahrens' jurisdictional rule in cases such as
those presented in Braden.99 Chief among these developments was
the emergence of new classes of prisoners who are able to
petition for habeas corpus because of the adoption of a
more expansive definition of the 'custody' requirement of
the habeas statute. The overruling of McNally v. Hill made
it possible for prisoners in custody under one sentence to
attack a sentence which they had not yet begun to serve.
And it also enabled a petitioner held in one State to attack a
detainer lodged against him by another State. In such a
case, the State holding the prisoner in immediate confinement acts as agent for the demanding State, and the custodian State is presumably indifferent to the resolution of the
prisoner's attack on the detainer. 100
Applying these principles to the case at hand, the Court found that the
detainee was legally in custody of the Commonwealth of Kentucky because
a detainer had been issued against him by the state court in Kentucky.' 0
The State of Alabama executed the detainer, as it was serving as agent for
Kentucky. 0 2 The Court held that jurisdiction existed in Kentucky for the
prisoner's petition challenging the Kentucky detainer. 10 3 The Court,
however, explicitly limited the breadth of its holding noting that "[u]nder
these circumstances it would serve no useful purpose to apply the Ahrens
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Braden, 410 U.S. 484 (1973).
Id. at 486.
Id.
Id. at 498.
Id. at 498-99 (citations omitted).
Braden, 410 U.S. at 488.
Id. at 486.
Id. at 484.
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rule and require that the action be brought in Alabama."' 1 4 Consequently,
Braden stands for the narrow proposition that in cases where a prisoner is in
custody in multiple jurisdictions within the United States, he may petition
for a writ of habeas corpus in a jurisdiction in which he suffers legal
confinement, though
not physical confinement, if his challenge is to that
105
legal confinement.
For the most part, the Braden court's reasoning was driven by considerations of forum convenience rather than by strict statutory interpretation.
The Court found that "[t]he expense and risk of transporting the petitioner
to the Western District of Kentucky, should his presence at a hearing prove
necessary, would in all likelihood be outweighed by the difficulties of
transporting records and witnesses from Kentucky to the district where
petitioner is confined.' ' 10 6 The Court found that Ahrens was flexible enough
to accommodate these pressing forum convenience considerations. 107
In light of the court's cautious reasoning, Braden is best viewed as a
forum non conveniens case construing the Ahrens statutory rule as
malleable in situations where a petitioner is held in custody (legal custody
or physical custody) in multiple federal jurisdictions. However, the Braden
decision had no intended affect on Eisentrager, which had held that the
invocation of the habeas statute was dependent on the presence of the
detainee within the jurisdiction of some federal district court, and in fact
Braden never mentioned Eisentrager.
IV. THE RASUL V. BUSH DECISION
A.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE

The petitioners in Rasul were two Australian citizens and twelve Ku0 8
waiti nationals who were captured during the hostilities in Afghanistan.1
In early 2002, they were all transported to Camp Delta at Guantanamo Bay,
and while there they were subjected to intense interrogation by military

104.
Id. at 499 (emphasis added).
105.
See id. at 484-85.
106.
Braden, 410 U.S. at 494.
107.
Id. at 499-500 (stating that Ahrens did not create "an inflexible jurisdictional
rule dictating the choice of an inconvenient forum even in a class of cases which could not
have been foreseen at the time of that decision.").
108.
Brief for Government at 10, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) [hereinafter
Brief for Government]. Originally when the court granted certiorari, the petitioners also
included two British citizens, Shafiq Rasul and Asif Iqbal. These petitioners had been
released from custody before the case was heard. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 471 n. 1.
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authorities. 10 9 Furthermore, the detainees, with the exception of one
petitioner, were held incommunicado. " 0
Between February 19 and March 11, 2002, the detainee's families
filed three separate petitions in the Federal District Court for the District of
Columbia seeking relief under the federal habeas corpus statute, as well as
Because of the similarities of the
under other jurisdictional bases."'
actions, the district court consolidated all three cases." 2 The government
promptly moved to dismiss the actions for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction citing Eisentragerand arguing that the habeas statute as written only
conferred to the district courts jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions brought3
by detainees held within the sovereign territory of the United States."
Agreeing with the government's argument, the district court dismissed the
petitioner's claims under authority of Eisentrager"4 stating that aliens

109.
Brief for Government, supra note 108, at 5-7. For a detailed account of the
military's interrogation and screening procedures see Dep't of Defense, Fact Sheet:
Guantanamo Detainees,availableat
http://www.Defenselink.mil/news/apr 2004/d20040406gua.pdf.
110.
Brief for Appellants at 4-5, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) [hereinafter
Brief for Appellants] (Petitioner David Hicks was designated under the President's Order
and was given the opportunity to meet with counsel.).
111.
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 471-72; Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 57-61, 63-64

(D.D.C. 2002), rev'd, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (The petitioners claimed that they had never
engaged in combat with the United States nor had they participated in terrorist acts. They
insisted that they were taken captive "by local villagers seeking promised bounties or other
financial rewards" while they were providing humanitarian aid in Afghanistan and Pakistan,
and turned over to United States custody.).
112.
Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 58-59. Although the Al-Odah petition did not
explicitly ask for release, the court viewed the complaint as a challenge to the validity and
legality of the detainee's custody. Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 57-58 (2002). The
court found that "the federal habeas statute [is] the only lawful way for the petitioners to
challenge their confinement." Id. at 63-64 (quoting Chatman-Bey, 864 F.2d at 809). See
also Monk v. Secretary of the Navy, 793 F.2d 364, 366 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (finding that
Congress had determined that habeas corpus is the appropriate federal remedy for a prisoner
who claims that he is "in custody in violation of the Constitution ... of the United States.").
113.
Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 65.
114.
Id. at 59. Another federal district court considered a habeas petition by a
separate group of Guantanamo detainees in Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 189 F. Supp. 2d
1036 (C.D. Cal. 2002), vacated by, Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 310 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir.
2002). As in Eisentrager, the petition was dismissed on standing grounds. The Ninth
Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the petition on standing grounds, but vacated the portion of
the trial court's opinion dealing with Eisentrager. Coalition of Clergy, 310 F.3d 1153. See
also John C. Eastman, Wrong Claim, Wrong Party, Wrong Court: Assessing the Petition
Brought by a Coalition of Clergy, Lawyers, & Professors on Behalf of Detainees Held by the
U.S. Military in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, THE FEDERALIST SOC'Y FOR L. AND PUB. POL'Y
STUD., at http://www.fed-soc.org/Publications/Terrorism/petition.pdf.
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detained outside the sovereign territory of the United States cannot invoke a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus."15
The Appellate Court affirmed, construing Eisentrager to hold that
"'the privilege of litigation' does not extend to aliens in military custody
who have no presence in 'any territory over which the United States is
sovereign.""' 6 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed,
overruling Eisentrager's statutory jurisdictional holding finding that
"Section 2241 [the habeas corpus statute] confers on the District Court
jurisdiction to hear
petitioners' habeas corpus challenges to the legality of
7
their detention."" t
B.

ANALYSIS OF THE MAJORITY OPINION

In its opinion, the Court framed the "narrow" issue as "whether the
habeas statute confers a right to judicial review of the legality of Executive
detention of aliens in a territory over which the United States exercises
plenary and exclusive jurisdiction, but not 'ultimate sovereignty.""' 18
In answering the question, the court severely limited the application of
Eisentrager,construing it as only applying to the constitutional inquiry of
habeas jurisdiction, and not the statutory question at bar. 119 The Court
concluded that the only reference that Eisentrager made to the habeas
statute "was a passing reference to the absence of statutory authorization:
'Nothing in the text of the
Constitution extends such a right, nor does
120
statutes.'
our
in
anything
The Rasul majority concluded that the reason for the Eisentrager
Court's terse treatment of the habeas statute was that the question of
whether the habeas statute applied was not actually before the Court. 12 1 To
explain this questionable finding, the majority examined the procedural
history of Eisentrager. It explained that in Eisentrager,the district court
dismissed the petition on the statutory authority of Ahrens.' 22 However,
according to the Rasul majority, the Eisentragercourt of appeals flouted the
statutory question and:
115.
Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 68. The court dismissed the suit with prejudice
because it found that since the United States did not have sovereign control over Guantanamo Bay, no federal court could exercise jurisdiction over the petitioner's claims. Id. at
59.
116.
Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting
Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 777-78).
117.
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484.
118.
Id. at 475 (quoting from the 1903 treaty, supra note 21).
119.
Id. at 475-76
120.
Id. at 476 (quoting Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 768).
121.
See id. at 476-77.
122.
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 476-77
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implicitly conceded that the District Court lacked jurisdiction under the habeas statute as it had been interpreted in
Ahrens. The Court of Appeals instead held that petitioners
had a constitutional right to habeas corpus secured by the
Suspension Clause, reasoning that 'if a person has a right to
a writ of habeas corpus, he cannot be deprived of the privilege by an omission in a federal jurisdictional statute. In
essence, the Court of Appeals concluded that the habeas
statute, as construed in Ahrens, had created an unconstitutional gap that had to be filled by reference to [constitutional] 'fundamentals.' In its review of that decision, this
Court, like the Court of Appeals, proceeded from the premise that 'nothing in our statutes' conferred federal-court jurisdiction, and accordingly evaluated the Court of Appeals'
resort to [constitutional] 'fundamentals' on its own
terms. 23
Accordingly, the majority concluded that in overruling the appellate court
in Eisentrager,the Supreme Court had only to pass judgment on the issue
of whether the Constitution provided the Eisentrager detainees with the
right to federal habeas review.
Thus, the court concluded that the sole basis of finding a statutory
ruling within Eisentrager can only be predicated upon its reliance on
Ahrens. This conclusion is somewhat skewed because, as stated earlier,
Ahrens left open the question of whether the habeas statute reached an alien
held outside the territorial jurisdiction of some district court-the very fact
pattern presented in Eisentrager.124 Furthermore, by applying the statutory
canon of constitutional avoidance and not holding that the habeas statute
was facially invalid, the Eisentrager Court of Appeals did find that the
statute applied. Consequently, to overrule this holding, the25Supreme Court
in Eisentragerhad to pass judgment on the statutory issue.
Following this somewhat distorted interpretation of Eisentrager, the
Rasul Court preceded to dramatically expand the Braden decision, finding
that it had in fact overruled the statutory holding of Ahrens filling "the
statutory gap that had occasioned the EisentragerCourt of Appeals' resort
to fundamentals" and under authority of Braden "persons detained outside
the territorial jurisdiction of any federal district court no longer need rely on
126
the Constitution as the source of their right to federal habeas review."
Consequently, since "Braden overruled the statutory predicate to Eisen123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 477-78 (citations omitted).
See supra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.B.
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 466 (emphasis added).
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trager's holding [Ahrens], Eisentrager plainly does 27not preclude the
exercise of § 2241 jurisdiction over petitioner's claims."1
This conclusion is puzzling considering that Braden stood for the limited proposition that where a petitioner is in custody in multiple jurisdictions within the United States, he may seek a writ of habeas corpus in a
jurisdiction in which he suffers legal confinement though not physical
confinement. 21 8 Braden's holding certainly served to distinguish Ahrens,
however, it had no intended impact on the unique question before the
Eisentrager court-whether an enemy alien held outside the territorial
jurisdiction of any federal district court could petition for issuance of the
129
writ. In fact, as stated above, Braden never even mentioned Eisentrager.
The Rasul court also contravened the "longstanding principle of
American law" that legislation is "presumed not to have extraterritorial
application unless such intent is clearly manifested."'' 30 The court found
that the presumption had no effect in the present context because the United
States held "complete jurisdiction and control" over the Naval Station at
Guantanamo Bay.1 31 The court expanded on this assertion and went on to
find that the habeas statute would reach any territory "under the subjection"
of the United States, 132 and would apply to all persons regardless of
citizenship. 33 Despite the fact that the writ of habeas corpus historically
only reached English citizens held outside the "sovereign dominion" of the
Crown,' 34 the court nevertheless found that its holding
was "consistent with
1 35
the historical reach of the writ of habeas corpus."
The majority ultimately concluded that the men held at Guantanamo
Bay enjoyed the right to challenge the legality of their detentions on the
basis of § 2241, thus dramatically expanding the statutory grant of
territorial jurisdiction to the federal courts- a practice heretofore exclusively reserved to Congress.

127.
128.

129.

Id.

See infra Part IV.C.

Id.

130.

Rasul, 542 U.S. at 480 (quoting EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S.

131.
132.
133.

Id.
Id.
Id.

244,248 (1991)).

134.

Id. at 482 (Scalia,

COMMENTARi S *78-*79).

135.

J.,

dissenting)

(citing

3 WILLIAM

BLACKSTONE,

Rasul, 542 U.S. at 480. See also supra Part III, notes 45-46 and accompanying
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JUSTICE SCALIA'S DISSENT

In his dissent, Justice Scalia correctly exposed the weaknesses in the
majority's jurisdictional analysis. 136 Justice Scalia first examined the text
of the habeas statute: "Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the
Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the
' 37 district courts and any circuit judge
within their respectivejurisdictions."'
Justice Scalia explained:
It [the statute] further requires that 'the order of a circuit
judge shall be entered in the records of the district court of
the district wherein the restraintcomplained of is had.'138 .
. .And § 2242 provides that a petition 'addressed to the
Supreme Court, a justice thereof or a circuit judge... shall
state the reasons for not making application to the39district
court of the district in which the applicantis held.1
After analyzing the text of the statute Justice Scalia concluded that "[n]o
matter to whom the writ is directed, custodian or detainee, the statute could
not be clearer that a necessary requirement for issuing the writ is that some
federal district court have territorial jurisdiction over the detainee. '40
Justice Scalia then dealt with the majority's finding that "the decisions
of this Court have placed a gloss on the phrase 'within their respective
jurisdictions' in § 2241" so that the habeas statute allows jurisdiction over
the Guantanamo detainees.' 4' He found that assertion illusory and noted
that "the only case in point holds just the opposite (and just what the statute
plainly says). That case is Eisentrager. .. ,142
In explaining the court's misreading of precedent, the dissent acknowledged that Ahrens stood for the proposition that the phrase "within
their respective jurisdictions" meant that "a district court has jurisdiction to
issue the writ only on behalf of petitioners detained within its territorial
jurisdiction."' 143 However, Ahrens left open "the question of what process,
if any, a person confined in an area not subject to the jurisdiction of any
district court may employ to assert federal rights."' 44 Justice Scalia

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 489 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J.).
Id. at 489 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (a) (emphasis in original)).
Id (emphasis in original).
Id. at 489-90. (emphasis in original)
Id. at 490 (emphasis in original).
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 489.
Id. at 490.
Id.
Id. (quoting Ahrens, 335 U.S. at 190 n. 4).
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observed, "[t]hat question, the45same question presented to the Court today,
was resolved in Eisentrager."1
In his analysis of Eisentrager,Justice Scalia accurately rejected the
Rasul majority's reading of the EisentragerCourt of Appeals' decision. He
precisely pointed out that "[t]he [Eisentrager]Court of Appeals concluded
that there was statutory jurisdiction."' 146 The EisentragerCourt of Appeals
arrived at this holding by application of the canons of constitutional
avoidance. Thus, the court determined that the statute as interpreted by
Ahrens created an unconstitutional gap whereby a person entitled to a
fundamental right would be precluded from enforcing that right in a federal
court. Rather than deeming the statute unconstitutional on its face, the
court "construed and147
applied" the statute to reach the claims of the
Eisentragerpetitioners.
Since the canon of constitutional avoidance underlay the Eisentrager
Court of Appeals' decision, Justice Scalia noted that by overruling the court
of appeals' constitutional interpretation, the Supreme Court in Eisentrager
did pass judgment on the question of whether the habeas statute granted
jurisdiction. 148 Moreover, the Supreme Court had to issue a ruling on
"whether the statute granted jurisdiction, since that was the basis for the
judgments of both lower courts. A conclusion of no constitutionally
conferred right would obviously not support reversal of a judgment that
rested upon a statutorily conferred right."' 149 Accordingly, "[t]he brevity of
the [Eisentrager]Court's statutory analysis signifies nothing more than that
the Court considered it obvious (as indeed it is) that unaided by the canon
of constitutional avoidance, the statute did not confer jurisdiction over an
alien detained outside the territorial jurisdiction of the courts of the United
States."15 °
Since Eisentragerwas constructed upon a "directly-on-point statutory
holding," the dissent observed that in order for the majority to accomplish
its desired result "it must either argue that our decision in Braden overruled
Eisentrager, or admit that it is overruling Eisentrager."'151 The dissent
argued that
[t]he former course should not pass the laugh test, inasmuch as Braden dealt with a detainee held within the territorial jurisdiction of a district court, and never mentioned
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id.
Rasul. 542 U.S. at 490.
Id. (quoting Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961, 966 (D.C. Cir. 1949)).
Id. at 493.
Id.
Id.
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 493 (emphasis added).
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Eisentrager. And the latter course would require the Court
to explain why our almost categorical rule of stare decisis
in statutory cases should be set aside in order to complicate
the present war, and having set it aside, to explain why the
habeas statute does not mean what it plainly says. So instead the Court tries an oblique course: 'Braden' it claims,
'overruled the statutorypredicate to Eisentrager'sholding'
by which it means the statutory analysis of Ahrens. Even
assuming, for the moment, that Braden overruled some aspect of Ahrens, inasmuch as Ahrens did not pass upon any
of the statutory issues decided by Eisentrager,it is hard to
see how any of 5that
case's 'statutory predicate' could have
2
been impaired. 1
Justice Scalia then explained the majority's error in finding that
Braden overruled Ahrens. As stated above, the Braden court was careful to
limit its application, thus saying that Braden's disposition hinged on the
post-Ahrens development of "new classes of prisoners who are able to
petition for habeas corpus because of the adoption of a more expansive
definition of the 'custody' requirement of the habeas statute.' 53 Relying
on the more "expansive definition of the 'custody' requirement" the
prisoner physically detained in Alabama could challenge a legal detainer
issued against him in Kentucky.154 "Under these circumstances it would
serve no useful purpose to apply the Ahrens rule and require that the action
be brought in Alabama." 55 In direct conflict with the majority's interpretation,
Braden stands for the proposition, and only the proposition,
that where a petitioner is in custody in multiple jurisdictions within the United States, he may seek a writ of habeas
corpus in a jurisdiction in which he suffers legal confinement, though not physical confinement, if his challenge is
to that legal confinement. Outside that class of cases,
Braden did not question the general rule of Ahrens (much
less that of Eisentrager). Where as here present physical
56
custody is at issue, Braden is inapposite... 1

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 493 (emphasis added).
Braden, 410 U.S. at 498.
Id.
Id. at 499.
Rasul. 542 U.S. at 495.
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Therefore, Justice Scalia surmised that the majority employed the assertion that "Braden overruled the statutory predicate to Eisentrager's
holding"
as a means of obfuscating its true intention-to overrule Eisen57
trager.1
The dissent also confronted the majority's argument that the habeas
statute may be given some extraterritorial effect because "the United States
exercises 'complete jurisdiction and control' over the Guantanamo Bay
Naval Base."'' 58 Justice Scalia considered this argument specious at best,
noting that
[s]ince jurisdiction and control obtained through a lease is
no different in effect from 'jurisdiction and control' acquired by lawful force of arms, parts of Afghanistan and
Iraq should logically be regarded as subject to our domestic
laws. Indeed, if 'jurisdiction and control' rather that sovereignty were the test, so would the Landsberg Prison in
Germany,
where the United States held the Eisentragerde1 59
tainees.
Lastly, the dissent explained the majority's error in finding that its
holding was supported by the historic scope of the writ. Referencing
Blackstone, Justice Scalia demonstrated that historically the writ of habeas
corpus only extended to areas over which the Crown had "sovereign
dominion."'' 60 If the writ was found to lie outside the sovereign
control of
6
the Crown, it was limited only to the Crown's subjects.1 1
In sum, Justice Scalia characterized the majority's opinion as a
"clumsy, countertextual reinterpretation" of the habeas statute inapposite to
Eisentrager.62 He concluded his dissent by chiding the majority for
creating "a monstrous scheme" that would "in time of war" lead to the
"frustration of our military commanders' reliance upon clearly stated prior
law." 163 For the court to create such precedent "is judicial adventurism of
the worst sort."' 164

157.
158.
159.

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. at 467.
Id. at 501 (quoting the 1903 Lease Agreement).
Id.
Id. at 502 (citing 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *78-*79).
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 502.
Id. at 506.
Id.
ld.
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V.

IMPLICATIONS OF RASUL

At the beginning of his majority opinion, Justice Stevens characterized
the issue before the court as "narrow." 165 However, the majority's opinion
created a scheme that could potentially have broad adverse consequences.
Among them, the court's decision appears to not only allow detainees held
at Guantanamo Bay to challenge their detention, but also permits enemy
aliens held in all other parts of the world over which the United States
exerts "jurisdiction and control" to seek habeas relief. This expansion has
the potential of frustrating many arguably compelling military interests by
effectively eliminating the military's ability to detain enemy aliens free
from judicial review.
Also, by doing away with the jurisdictional requirement that an enemy
alien must physically be found within the territorial jurisdiction of the
federal court in which his petition is filed, the majority opinion creates a
system under which an enemy alien simply has to choose a forum with
jurisdiction over the Secretary of Defense, rather than a district with
jurisdiction over his person and his immediate custodian.166 This aspect of
the Rasul decision allows enemy aliens to forum shop, creating a legal
paradox whereby an enemy alien enjoys a greater set of rights under the
habeas statute than a domestic detainee. Each of these consequences will
be considered more fully below.
A.

WORLD-WIDE EXTENSION OF THE HABEAS STATUTE

By eliminating the apparent statutory requirement that a habeas petitioner must be physically located in some federal district, the "narrow"
holding of Rasul "boldly extends the scope of the habeas statute to the four
corners of the earth.' ' 167 "[T]his holding, as applied to aliens outside the
country, is breathtaking."' 168 The court attempted to provide a "backstop" to
this expansion by stating the statute would only extend to lands subject to
the "jurisdiction and control" of the United States. However, the majority's
reasoning implies that this limitation is based on what the court perceived
as the historical reach of habeas corpus. Therefore, any territory under the
subjection of the United States is subject to its jurisdiction and control.
This amorphous standard is really no limitation at all, because any area
where the United States military detains enemy aliens will necessarily be
found in territory under the subjection of the United States. Therefore, the
United States will exert the requisite jurisdiction and control to allow
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at 470.
Id. at 477-78.
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 498 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
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invocation of § 2241. Under the Rasul jurisdictional test, § 2241 reaches
military installations like Guantanamo Bay, which are found in places
throughout the world, including Afghanistan, Iraq, Germany, South Korea,
and Japan. The fact that the United States does not possess sovereignty
over these areas simply does not factor into the court's calculus.
To provide a sense of the broad impact of the decision, suppose the
clock was turned back to December 1945. According to military records
the United States armed forces had in its custody over two million enemy
soldiers at that time.' 69 These men were held all over the world in areas
"under the subjection" of the United States military. There is little doubt
that many, if not all, of these prisoners would complain about the legality of
their detention. Under the Rasul decision, § 2241 would accommodate the
habeas claims filed by all two million detainees. As the dissent recognized,
[t]he Court's unheralded expansion of federal-court jurisdiction is not even mitigated by a comforting assurance that
the legion of ensuing claims will easily be resolved on the
merits. To the contrary, the Court says that the 'petitioners
allegations . . . unquestionably describe 'custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States. From this point forward, federal courts will entertain petitions from these prisoners, and others like them
around the world, challenging actions and events far away,
and forcing the courts to oversee70 one aspect of the Executive's conduct of a foreign war.'
B.

THE COURT'S JURISDICTIONAL EXPANSION INTERFERES WITH THE
ABILITY OF THE EXECUTIVE TO EFFECTIVELY PROSECUTE THE WAR ON
TERROR

As stated earlier, President Bush has declared a War on Terrorism, and
Congress has provided the President with the authority and means to
prosecute that war to a successful conclusion. Arguably, in order for the
military to carry out the president's orders and subdue the nation's enemies,
it must be allowed to capture and detain enemy combatants free from
interference by the judiciary. "Such detention serves the vital military
objectives of preventing captured combatants from rejoining the conflict
and gathering intelligence to further the overall war effort and prevent

169.

G.

170.

Rasul, 542 U.S. at 499 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

LEWIS & J. MEWHA, DEPARTMENT OF ARMY, HISTORY OF PRISONER OF WAR

UTILIZATION BY THE UNITED STATES ARMY 1776-1945, Pamphlet No. 20-213, 244 (1955).
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additional attacks. The military's authority to capture
and detain such
17
combatants is both well-established and time honored."' '
The Executive attempted to effectuate these policies by choosing
Guantanamo Bay as the area to hold terrorists and other enemy aliens. The
commander-in-chief and his generals "had every reason to expect that the
internment of combatants at Guantanamo Bay would not have the consequences of bringing the cumbersome machinery of our domestic courts into
military affairs."' 72 The Rasul court, by overruling Eisentrager'sstatutory
holding, certainly frustrated those expectations as to Guantanamo Bay.
Moreover, the Rasul jurisdictional test virtually eliminates the ability of the
military to hold prisoners outside the purview of the federal courts
anywhere in the world. Warning against such interference the Eisentrager
court said:
[s]uch trials would hamper the war effort and bring aid and
comfort to the enemy. They would diminish the prestige of
our commanders, not only with enemies but with wavering
neutrals. It would be difficult to devise more effective fettering of a field commander than to allow the very enemies
he is ordered to reduce to submission to call him to account
in his own civil courts and divert his efforts and attention
from the
military offensive abroad to the legal defensive at
73
home.

C.

ENCOURAGES VENUE SHOPPING

The Rasul decision found that "an alien captured in a foreign theater of
active combat" need merely to "bring a § 2241 petition against the
Secretary of Defense,"' 74 or any other executive with supervisory control
171.
Brief for Government, supra note 108 at 5 (citing Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327
U.S. 304, 313-14 (1946); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30-31 & n. 8 (1942); 2 L.
OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 368-69 (H. Lauterpacht 7th ed. 1952)).

Reports have

noted that nearly ten percent of the detainees who have been released from Guantanamo Bay
have either been recaptured or killed while fighting U.S. forces. Christopher M. Schumann,
Note, Bring It On: The Supreme Court Opens the Floodgates with Rasul v. Bush, 55 A.F.L.
REV. 349, 368 (2004) (citing Shaun Waterman, Released DetaineesReturn to Fighting U.S.,
United Press International (July 6, 2004), available at http:// washingtontimes.comlupibreaking/20040705-080713-4578r.htm.
172.
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 506 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
173.
Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 779-80.
174.
Id. at 498 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). The majority made mention of this specific
requirement in a passing statement: "In the end, the answer to the question presented is clear.
Petitioners contend that they are being held in federal custody in violation of the laws of the
United States. No party questions the District Court's jurisdiction over petitioners'
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over the detainees custodian. This perfunctory holding as to enemy aliens
is in direct conflict with the court's rulings in the context of domestic
detainees.
In the domestic context, the Supreme Court held in Rumsfeld v.
Padilla,17 5 a case handed down on the very same day as Rasul, that a
proceeding under the habeas statute must be brought against "some person
who has the immediate custody of the party detained, with the power to
produce the body of such party before the court or judge, that he may be
liberated if no sufficient reason is shown to the contrary."' 176 In accord with
this requirement, the Padillacourt affirmed the "default rule that the proper
respondent is the warden of the facility where the prisoner is being held, not
the Attorney General or some other remote supervisory official. 177 This
rule, the court argued,
serves the important purpose of preventing forum shopping
by habeas petitioners. Without it, a prisoner could name a
high-level supervisory official as respondent and then sue
that person wherever he is amenable to long-arm jurisdiction. The result would be rampant forum shopping, district
courts with overlapping jurisdiction, and the very inconvenience, expense and embarrassment Congress sought to
avoid78when it added the jurisdictional limitation 137 years
ago.1
Without any explanation, the Rasul court carved an exception to the
Padilla ruling for enemy aliens held outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
district courts. Under Rasul, an enemy alien may name as respondent the
President, 79 the Secretary of Defense, or any other high ranking executive
official with the requisite supervisory connection to the detainees'
immediate custodian, and bring a habeas action in any forum where that
official is amenable to the district court's long-arm jurisdiction. This
effectively means that the Guantanamo detainees or any other enemy alien
detained outside the territory of the United States can bring a habeas
petition in any of the ninety-four federal districts. Noting this consequence
the dissent stated "[t]he fact that extraterritorially located detainees lack the
custodians." Id. at 483. In fact, there was no discussion of who was the correct custodian,
much less whether a district court had jurisdiction over him.
175.
542 U.S. 426 (2004) (quoting Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564 (1885) (emphasis
in original)).
176.
Id. at 435 (quoting Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564 (1885) (emphasis in
original)).
177.
Id. at 447.
178.
Id. at 447.
179.
President Bush was one of the named parties in the Rasul case.
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district of detention that the statute requires has been converted from a
factor that precludes their ability to bring a petition at all into a factor that
frees them to petition wherever they wish."' 80 Thus, conferring upon
extraterritorially detained enemy
aliens greater habeas rights than domesti81
1
petitioners.
detained
cally
VI. NORMATIVE EXPLANATIONS FOR RASUL AND APPROPRIATE
STATUTORY RESPONSES

The jurisdictional power the federal courts wield is directly granted by
congressional act, and the Supreme Court has traditionally guarded against
any expansion of that power by judicial interpretation or decree, conceding
that such authority rests solely with Congress. That tradition ended with
Rasul.182 The Court's broad expansion of federal court jurisdiction, and the
resulting consequences have been accurately characterized as "judicial
adventurism of the worst sort."'' 83 This anomaly presents the question, why
would the Court abandon precedent and disregard long-standing policies of
restraint in order to embark on such an uncharted course? Perhaps the
answer is veiled under the spurious rationalization the court used to reach

180.
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 506.
181.
It is true that the Supreme Court has "implicitly recognized an exception to the
immediate custodian rule in the military context." Padilla,542 U.S. at 436, n. 9. However,
this exception has only applied in cases where an American citizen was detained beyond the
territorial jurisdiction of a federal court. United States v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955)
(finding that a court-martial convict may properly name the Secretary of the Air Force as
respondent); Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953) (ruling that court-martial convicts
detained in Guam may name Secretary of Defense as respondent). Using the majority's
reasoning, one could argue that since the habeas statute fails to distinguish between citizens
and non-citizens, it is a logical extrapolation to extend the exception to the Guantanamo
detainees. This argument fails because it assumes that the basis for conferring jurisdiction in
those cases is found in the habeas statute. The author contends that the exception is based
on constitutional grounds. Therefore, since an American citizen acquires his rights to
habeas through the constitution, the habeas statute must necessarily reach him through the
canons of constitutional avoidance, lest the statute be rendered unconstitutional.
182.
The court really gave no reason for its change of course, noting this the dissent
stated:
The reality is this: Today's opinion, and today's opinion alone, extends
the habeas statute, for the first time, to aliens held beyond the sovereign
territory of the United States and beyond the territorial jurisdiction of its
courts. No reasons are given for this result: no acknowledgement of its
consequences made. By spurious reliance on Braden the Court evades
explaining why stare decisis can be disregarded, and why Eisentrager
was wrong.
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 497 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
183.
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 506.
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its decision. 184 Noting the history and the political climate surrounding the
Guantanamo detainees, perhaps Rasul is really nothing more than a political
statement cloaked in legal garb.
As noted before, the plight of the Guantanamo detainees triggered a
political firestorm. Both domestic and international observers accused the
United States of defying international norms and violating basic human
rights. Many legal scholars wrote volumes on the inherent rights of the
enemy aliens, creating arguments unfettered by jurisprudential restraints in
order to reach the correct political outcome, which was almost universally
viewed as the immediate release of the Guantanamo detainees, and the
public rebuke of the President's policies. 85 It is more than probable that
the Rasul court succumbed to what one scholar referred to as "the temptations of politics.' ' 186 Viewed
in this light, the court's oblique reasoning is
87
more easily understood.

184.
The Court, in essence, based its conclusion on the Braden decision, and
ultimately concluded that it overruled Eisentrager'sstatutory predicate. This conclusion is
illusory at best especially considering that Braden was a forum convenience case, and it
never mentioned Eisentrager.
185.
See Amann, supra note 1.
186.
ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 1-18 (1990). Judge Bork
characterizes the process and its results as follows:
In law, the moment of temptation is the moment of choice, when a judge
realizes that in the case before him his strongly held view of justice, his
political and moral imperative, is not embodied in a statute or in any
provision of the Constitution. He must then choose between his version
of justice and abiding by the American form of government. Yet the desire to do justice, whose nature seems to him obvious, is compelling,
while the concept of constitutional process is abstract, rather arid, and
the abstinence it counsels unsatisfying. To give in to temptation, this
one time, solves an urgent human problem, and a faint crack appears in
the American foundation. A judge has begun to rule where a legislator
should.
Id.
187.
There appears to be a growing trend whereby Supreme Court justices have been
willing to give strong consideration to the concerns of the international community
regardless of whether those concerns are reflected in precedent or in the tradition and history
of the United States. Justice O'Connor has argued that U.S. courts should give strong
consideration to the laws and standards of other nations. Sandra Day O'Connor, Federalism
of Free Nations, 28 N.Y.U.J. Int.'i L. & Pol. 35, 41 (1996). In the affirmative action
context, three justices led by Justice Ginsburg decided the issue in part based on
international norms. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., joined by
Breyer, J., concurring); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 303 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., joined by
Souter & Breyer, JJ., dissenting). In 2002, in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), six
justices treated international opinions as central to the court's decision to strike down laws
allowing the executions of mentally retarded persons. Id. (Stevens, J., joined by O'Connor,
Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, & Breyer, JJ.).
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Regardless of whether the correct outcome was achieved by the
court's decision, it is the collateral implications of the holding that renders
it unpalatable. Congress has never granted the courts world-wide territorial
jurisdiction, and it is difficult to believe that it would implement such an
expansion in a time of war expressly to facilitate judicial review of military
actions. Thus, it is astonishing for the Supreme Court to endow itself and
the lower courts with the very powers that Congress would certainly refuse
to grant.
However, the errors in Rasul may be corrected. An interesting feature
of the Rasul decision is that the court strictly based its decision on statutory
grounds, rather than constitutional grounds. Nothing in the majority
opinion ought to prevent Congress from amending the habeas statute in
order to abrogate Rasul's countertextual reinterpretation of the federal
habeas scheme, bringing the Court's great judicial adventure to an end.
A.

SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS

One suggested remediation is amending the habeas statute to explicitly
require that any alien seeking to invoke habeas jurisdiction must be
physically located in the territorial jurisdiction of some federal district
court. The amendment could state something similar to the following:
Any alien wishing to petition for relief under this section
must be physically located within the respective jurisdiction of a district court of the United States.
This language effectively overrules Rasul, and would allow military
officials to detain enemy aliens free from judicial review, so long as they
were held outside United States territory. This statutory language would
also serve to reaffirm and codify Eisentrager. The provision is also
consistent with the history and purpose of habeas corpus.
Secondly, in order to avoid any constitutional conflicts as to United
States citizens, an additional amendment could be added stating:
Any United States citizen wishing to petition for relief under this section who is not physically located within the respective territorial jurisdiction of a district court of the
United States, may file a petition in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and shall name as
respondent the appropriate executive official exerting supervisory control over his immediate custodian.
This amendment takes into consideration the fact that, as Eisentragernoted,
United States citizens, and United States citizens alone, are vested with a
constitutional right to habeas corpus. Moreover, by naming a specific
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federal district to hear the claims of these citizens, Congress eliminates the
dangers of forum shopping. The amendment also acknowledges an
exception to the immediate custody rule of Padilla by allowing an
executive official to serve as respondent.
Finally, if Congress wishes to allow the federal courts to entertain the
habeas petitions filed by enemy aliens held at Guantanamo Bay, it could
implement language placing Guantanamo Bay in the territorial jurisdiction
of a federal district court. The amendment could state:
Any person held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, wishing to file
a petition for relief under this section, shall file his petition
in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. He shall name as respondent the appropriate executive official exerting supervisory control over his immediate custodian.
This language achieves the correct political result apparently sought by the
Rasul court, while at the same time ameliorating the statutory, and forum
shopping implications of its holding.
Not only will these revisions correct the forum shopping and separation of powers problems of Rasul, they will also serve the compelling
interest of providing the military with unambiguous legal standards upon
which to organize its affairs. The military will have notice that any enemy
alien brought to Guantanamo Bay may petition a federal court for habeas
relief, and it may choose to hold that prisoner elsewhere. Under the Rasul
regime, however, the military was at worst prevented from detaining enemy
aliens at all without judicial interference, and at best uncertain where it
could hold prisoners without invoking judicial review.
VII. CONCLUSION

The Rasul decision charted a new path in federal jurisdiction jurisprudence by expanding the writ of habeas corpus to enemy aliens held outside
the territorial sovereignty of the United States. The justification used by the
majority for embarking on this adventure was that in Braden, a forum
convenience case decided in the context of domestic detentions, the Court
had supposedly abrogated the statutory predicate of Eisentrager, a case
deciding the extraterritorial reach of the habeas statute as to enemy aliens
- the very issue before the Rasul court. As the dissent cogently argued,
that conclusion was illusory at best. A more lucid explanation for Rasul's
strained reasoning is that the Court implicitly based its conclusion on
external norms and reinterpreted the habeas statutory scheme, along with
applicable case law, in order to achieve a politically more palatable result.
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Whether or not one agrees with the result of Rasul, the wide-ranging
implications of the case - extending habeas to the four corners of the
earth, thus potentially hamstringing the executive's ability to effectively
prosecute war; establishing a regime promoting forum shopping, and an
inequitable distribution of rights between extraterritorially detained
petitioners, and domestic detainees; and placing the utility and efficacy of
military detentions in doubt - are unacceptable. Absent a constitutional
problem any expansion of federal jurisdictional rights should be enacted by
Congress and Congress alone, and Rasul serves as an example of why that
rule should be followed.
This article calls upon Congress to abrogate Rasul and restore certainty and reliability in the habeas scheme. A Congressional resolution of
the issue can provide an effective and clean resolution to the Guantanamo
quandary. In that arena, political powers may debate the issues of external
norms and international standards of human rights. Through such a
process, Congress can formulate an equitable solution to the issue free of
the unseemly consequences neither considered nor remedied by the Rasul
court.
A.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Most recently, and long after the completion of this article in the Fall
of 2004, Congress did amend the habeas statute as part of the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005, which went into effect on January 6, 2006. The
amendment reads as follows:
e) Except as provided in section 1005 of the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005, no court, justice, or judge shall
have jurisdiction to hear or consider-(1) an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on
behalf of an alien detained by the Department of Defense at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; or
(2) any other action against the United States or its agents
relating to any aspect of the detention by the Department of
Defense of an alien at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who(A) is currently in military custody; or
(B) has been determined by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in accordance
with the procedures set forth in section 1005(e)
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of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant. 18
Although one may disagree with Congress's decision to not extend habeas
jurisdiction to Guantanamo Bay, the decision itself-whether or not to
expand federal court jurisdiction-lies exclusively with Congress and not
the courts. That remains a basic tenet of constitutional law, which the
Rasul court failed to follow.
Although I plan to more fully address the implications of the new statute
in a future work, a few points bear mentioning. First, the statute certainly
overrules Rasul as to its application to the Guantanamo Bay detainees;
however, it still leaves the basic holding of Rasul intact. The statute simply
fails to address habeas petitions that may be filed by detainees held in
military installations other than Guantanamo. Secondly, Rasul's unintended consequence of allowing these potential alien habeas petitioners to
forum shop goes unremedied. And lastly, the statute fails to address the
jurisdiction and venue questions as to those petitions already filed by
Guantanamo detainees and working their way through the courts. In effect,
Congress did little to remedy the infirmities of the Rausl decision and
Congress should certainly consider a broader solution to the problems
addressed by this article.

188 Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2742 (codified as amended in 10 U.S.C. § 801 and
28 U.S.C. § 2241(2006)).

